Employment Discrimination-Seniority Systems Under Title VII: American Tobacco Co. v. Pattersonand Pullman-Standard v. Swint by McCluskey, Joseph D.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 10
1983
Employment Discrimination-Seniority Systems
Under Title VII: American Tobacco Co. v.
Pattersonand Pullman-Standard v. Swint
Joseph D. McCluskey
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond
Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph D. McCluskey, Employment Discrimination-Seniority Systems Under Title VII: American Tobacco Co. v. Pattersonand Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 439 (1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss2/10
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-SENIORITY SYSTEMS
UNDER TITLE VII: AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON
AND PULLMAN-STANDARD v. SWINT
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 "is a broad remedial measure
designed 'to assure equality of employment opportunities.' " The Su-
preme Court, in the seminal Title VII employment discrimination case,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,s stated that "[t]he objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII ... was to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees."" The Griggs
decision has provided the basic framework for analyzing employment dis-
crimination cases. The Court held that any employment practices, proce-
dures or tests (employment practices) that had the consequences of
favoring white employees over other employees was proscribed by Title
VII.5 The Griggs Court perceived that Congress' intent was to remove all
barriers to employment which operate to discriminate against blacks and
all other protected classes.6 Discriminatory intent was not necessary. 7 Any
act of an employer" that operated to "freeze the status quo of prior dis-
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
2. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1783-84 (1982) (quoting McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
3. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
4. Id. at 429-30.
5. Id. at 432. In Griggs, the Court stated that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to
the consequences of employment practices, not simply to motivation." Id.
6. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classifications." Id. at 431.
7. The Court stated that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not re-
deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id. at 432. See generally
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McNeil v. McDonough, 515 F. Supp.
113 (D.N.J. 1980), afl'd, 648 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1981).
8. Title VII defines an employer's illegal employment practice as follows:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
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criminatory employment practices" was deemed illegal unless excused by
"business necessity.""0 Congress' clear intent in including Title VII in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to remove barriers to employment for minor-
ities and to force employers to make employment decisions on the basis
of job qualifications rather than on the basis of "race, sex, religion or na-
tional origin.""" Congress included sanctions in Title VII against an em-
ployer whose employment practices discriminate against a qualified job
applicant or employee. Section 706(g) 2 empowers the courts to enjoin the
employer "from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and or-
der such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include...
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.'I
When the Civil Rights Act of 196414 was introduced in Congress there
was widespread concern that Title VII of the Act would destroy one of
"the benefits which organized labor had attained through the years [-]
. . . the seniority system."' During the pre-enactment debates on the
Act, numerous statements16 and documents17 were entered into the Con-
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
9. 401 U.S. at 430.
10. Id. at 431. Cf. Business necessity is also referred to by the courts as business purpose.
In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in defining
business purpose stated that
[t]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adher-
ing to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate
business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient opera-
tion of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to
overrule any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the bus-
iness purpose it is alleged to serve, and there must be available no acceptable alterna-
tive policies or pratices which would better accomplish the business purpose ad-
vanced or accomplish it equally well without a lesser differential impact.
444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
11. 401 U.S. at 429-31. See generally International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
12. Title VII § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
13. Id. The Supreme Court has held that the granting of retroactive seniority relief to a
discriminatee is one of the equitable remedies allowed under section 706(g). Franks v. Bow-
man Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976).
14. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 17,783 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. ch. 21 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
15. 110 CONG. REC. 486 (1964) (comments of Sen. Hill). See American Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1539 (1982) (citing H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65
(1963)) ("[Tlhe House Minority Report warned that the bill, if enacted, would destroy se-
niority."). See also 110 CONG. REC. 11,472 (1964) (Governor Wallace's view is that "[u]nion
seniority systems will be abrogated under the unlimited power granted to Federal inspectors
to regulate hiring, firing, promoting and demoting.").
16. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (comments of Sen. Clark). "The bill would not
affect seniority at all." Id.
17. See, e.g., id. at 7213 (interpretive memorandum submitted jointly by Sens. Clark and
[Vol. 17:439440
SENIORITY SYSTEMS
gressional Record which were intended to allay the fears that Title VII
would affect seniority systems adversely. After extensive debate and
study, the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill"' was introduced in the Sen-
ate.19 Section 703(h) of Title VII,10 a part of the Mansfield-Dirksen sub-
stitute bill, was intended to placate those who thought Title VII would
harm existing seniority rights. Section 703(h) provides, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title ... it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority... system... provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.2
In his remarks to the Senate accompanying the introduction of the
Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill, Senator Everett Dirksen stated that
[a]s I look back now now [sic] upon the time that has been devoted to the
bill, I doubt very much whether in my whole legislative lifetime any mea-
sure has received so much meticulous attention. We have tried to be mind-
ful of every word, of every comma, and of the shading of every phrase.22
Despite the great care taken in drafting, the failure of Congress to
clearly define terms and establish limits has rendered the application of
section 703(h) one of the most perplexing problems facing the courts
under Title VII. 23 In litigation regarding seniority systems, the courts
have been struggling over Congressional intent embodied in the terms
"intention to discriminate" and "bona fide seniority system" as well as
whether seniority systems adopted after the Act were intended to come
under section 703(h) immunity.
Two of the Supreme Court's recent decisions addressed several of the
problems raised by section 703(h). Pullman-Standard v. Swint24 did
much to define the requisite "intent" necessary under section 703(h) and
to define a "bona fide seniority system." In American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-
terson,25 the Court settled the issue of whether seniority systems adopted
Case). "Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights." Id.
18. Id. at 11,926.
19. See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 431
(1966) (discussing the legislative history of the adoption of Title VII).
20. 110 CONG. REc. 11,931 (1964). Section 703(h) was enacted during the same wording as
that of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill proposal. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1976).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
22. 110 CONG. REC. 11,935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
23. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers Union v. United States, 416 F.2d
980, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
24. 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
25. 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982).
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after the effective date of Title VII are protected under section 703(h).
This comment examines these decisions and their effect on Title VII as
well as other litigation surrounding this important legislation.
II. BACKGROUND
Congress clearly intended that the consequence of an employer's em-
ployment practice be the determining factor in judging discrimination
under Title VII. Section 703(h) makes bona fide seniority systems im-
mune from the "consequences test ' 26 by requiring a showing of an intent
to discriminate. Congress realized that invalidating a seniority system pe-
nalized the employees who had contracted for seniority rights with the
employer and did little to punish the discriminating employer. In Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,27 the Supreme
Court stated that "Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing senior-
ity lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of
employees simply because their employers had engaged in discrimination.
•..,,2s The main thrust of Title VII is to assire "equality of employment
opportunities" 29 without unduly jeopardizing the vested seniority rights
of the employee.
A number of courts, in ruling on the validity of seniority systems, have
apparently failed to see, or have chosen to ignore, the inherent distinction
between seniority systems and other employment practices under Title
VII. Some of these courts, unable to find an intention to discriminate,
have circumvented this requirement and used the "consequences test" to
find that a system is not bona fide. For example, in Kaplan v. Interna-
tional Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and Motion Picture
Machine Operators of the United States and Canada,30 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that "[w]here a seniority system perpetuates
the effects of past discrimination, such a system is not 'bona fide' within
the meaning of Title VII." 31
26. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1972). See supra note 7 and accompany-
ing text.
27. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
28. Id. at 353-54. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Va. 1968)
("Seniority rights ... are expectancies derived from the collective bargaining agreement.").
See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976) ("there is no argument
that the award of retroactive seniority to the victims of hiring discrimination in any way
deprives other employees of indefeasibly vested rights"). See generally Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1974) (In discussing
seniority systems the court said that if seniority systems were invalidated because they per-
petuate the effects of past discrimination it "would be tantamount to shackling white em-
ployees with a burden of a past discrimination created not by them but by their em-
ployer."), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
29. 401 U.S. at 429.
30. 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975).
31. Id. at 1362. See also Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 118 (5th Cir.
442 [Vol. 17:439
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Other courts, failing to distinguish between seniority and seniority sys-
tems, have ordered that plantwide seniority systems replace nondiscrimi-
natory departmental seniority systems to "make right" prior acts of dis-
crimination unrelated to the seniority system. 2 A better solution might
have been for the courts to grant the retroactive seniority relief allowed
under section 706(g) rather than to invalidate the whole system.
III. THE Pullman-Standard v. Swint DECISION
A. Facts
In Pullman-Standard v. Swint,33 Swint, a black employee, and other
black employees instituted a Title VII challenge to the validity of a de-
partmental seniority system that was negotiated and maintained by the
Pullman-Standard Company (Company) and the United Steelworkers of
America and its Local 1466 (collectively "USW"). 3 ' Swint alleged that the
departmental seniority system at the Company's Bessemer plant was dis-
criminatory in that it "perpetuated the effects of past discrimination." 35
Before and after its unionization in the 1940's, the plant was divided into
a number of operational departments.3 6 Until 1965'7 the Company dis-
criminated on the basis of race in making job assignments. 8 The majority
of the departments at Bessemer were integrated, however, each job type
within a particular department was categorized as either a "black" or
"white" job. There were no lines of progression or promotion between the
black and white jobs.3 9 This effectively kept the races segregated.
The seniority system challenged by Swint was adopted by the Com-
pany in 1954 as the result of a negotiated, collective bargaining agreement
between the Company and the USW.4 0 Under the system, seniority was
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1975); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 450
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
32. See, e.g., Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 852 (5th Cir.), modified, 556
F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). The Supreme Court in California
Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant distinguished between seniority and seniority systems when it
stated that" '[S]eniority' is a term that connotes length of employment. A 'seniority system'
is a scheme that ... allots to employees ever improving employment rights and benefits as
their relative lengths of pertinent employment increase." 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980).
33. 102 S. Ct. at 1781 (1982).
34. Id. at 1783.
35. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1781
(1982).
36. 102 S. Ct. at 1784 n.3 ("[P]rior to unionization, the Bessemer plant was divided into
20 departments. By 1954, there were 28 departments.... The departments remained essen-
tially unchanged after 1954.").
37. Title VII went into effect on July 5, 1965, one year after the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was passed. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S. Ct. at 1535 n.1 (1982).
38. 102 S. Ct. at 1785.
39. 624 F.2d at 527.
40. 102 S. Ct. at 1785.
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measured by the length of continuous service within a department.41
When an employee transferred from one department to another, his de-
partmental seniority was forfeited.42 Initially, departmental seniority was
used only in transferring, laying off, and rehiring employees, however, be-
ginning in 1956 the system was also used for promotional purposes. 43
There were no significant changes made to the seniority system between
1956 and 1971, the time the lawsuit was commenced.4 4 At that point
USW represented twenty-six of the departmental units in the Bessemer
plant, involving approximately an equal number of black and white
employees.45
B. Decision
At trial, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, sitting without a jury, ruled that the seniority system was valid
and did not intentionally discriminate against black employees; conse-
quently, the system was protected under section 703(h).' 6 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, after reviewing the facts, reversed the district
court, finding the seniority system to be discriminatory under the "clearly
erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.47 The court of appeals concluded that
[a]n analysis of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
creation and continuance of the departmental system at Pullman-Standard
leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. There is no doubt, based upon the record in this case, about the exis-
tence of a discriminatory purpose.4
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was
whether a Court of Appeals is bound by the "clearly erroneous" rules of
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52(a) in reviewing a District Court's finding of fact,
arrived at after a lengthy trial, as to the motivation of the parties who nego-
tiated a seniority system; and whether the court below applied wrong legal
criteria in determining the bona fides of the seniority systems.49
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, determining
that two errors had been committed in their reversal of the district court.
The court held that the court of appeals had made an independent deter-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. An employee did not lose accumulated seniority when he transferred at the com-
pany's request or when he transferred to avoid being laid off. Id. at 1785 n.6.
44. Id. at 1785.
45. Id. at 1784, 1784 n.3.
46. 624 F.2d at 528.
47. 102 S. Ct. at 1783.
48. 624 F.2d at 533 (footnote omitted).
49. 102 S. Ct. at 1783.
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mination of the issues after reviewing the facts rather than a determina-
tion that the district court's findings of fact were "clearly erroneous."50
The Supreme Court also held that the court of appeals erred when it
failed to remand the case to the district court for further proceedings af-
ter it determined that the district court had made an error in interpreting
the law.5 1
C. Analysis and Significance
The significance of the Pullman-Standard52 decision in relation to sec-
tion 703(h)53 is the Court's definitive statement concerning the necessary
requirements to prove an "intention to discriminate" and the guidelines
it adopted to determine whether a seniority system is bona fide. Prior to
Pullman-Standard no clear guidelines existed. For example, in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison," the Supreme Court ruled that before a
seniority system is determined violative of Title VII, actual proof of in-
tent to discriminate must be shown under section 703(h).55 The Court,
however, failed to explain in Hardison or in any other case prior to Pull-
man-Standard what the minimum requirements for proof of intent to
discriminate entail.
The Supreme Court began its discussion of "intent" in Pullman-Stan-
dard by stating that intent to discriminate is a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court.56 The Court stated categorically that the
disparate impact test, used in determining whether employment practices
violated Title VII, was not sufficient to invalidate a seniority system. The
Court reasoned that since section 703(h) specifically requires an "intent
to discriminate.., it would make no sense.., to say that the intent
... may be presumed from such an impact."57 The Court stated that
intent, as it relates to section 703(h), requires actual motive and that
some legal presumption "drawn from a factual showing of something less
50. Id. at 1791-92. An appellate court in reviewing the decision of a lower court is not
empowered to "retry issues of fact or substitute its judgment with respect to such issues for
that of the trial court." Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 417 (8th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 781 (1944). See also United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate
Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 495 (1950); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 114 (9th Cir. 1962);
Kansas City Stockyards Co. v. Anderson, 199 F.2d 91, 93 (8th cir. 1952).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 1792. Although the application of Rule 52(a) by the circuit court of
appeals was the central issue to be decided by the Supreme Court, further discussion of this
subject is beyond the scope of this comment.
52. 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
53. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). See supra text accompanying note
21.
54. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
55. Id. at 83 n.13 ("[Section] 703(h) unequivocally mandates that there is no statutory
violation in the absence of a showing of disciminatory purpose").
56. 102 S. Ct. at 1790.
57. Id.
1983]
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than actual motive"" would not meet this burden. In determining
whether intention to discriminate exists for section 703(h) purposes, the
courts are not to be concerned with the discriminatory impact or conse-
quences that a seniority system has. Rather, the central question to be
asked when considering the existence of discriminatory intent is "[w]as
the system adopted because it would have a racially discriminatory. im-
pact?" 59 Discriminatory intent can be found only if the basic reason for
the adoption of the seniority system is that it will serve to discriminate
against a particular class of employees.8 0
Congress included section 703(h) in Title VII to protect the vested se-
niority rights of employees.61 If Congress had intended that discrimina-
tion in seniority systems and other employment practices be judged by
the same standards, the part of section 703(h) which pertains to seniority
systems would be mere surplusage.62 It appears that Congress balanced
its goal of achieving equality in employmente s with its goal of protecting
employees' seniority expectations64 and reached a compromise. Congress
did not preclude the possibility of declaring a seniority system invalid,
nor did it allow the burden of proof of discrimination to be met so easily
that any time an employee could show a system had an adverse impact on
him the system would be invalidated.
Section 706(g) of Title VII provides employees various remedies, in-
cluding retroactive seniority, if their employer's employment practices ad-
versely affect their employment opportunities.6 By allowing retroactive
seniority relief, the discriminatee is placed in the position he would have
been "but for" the employer's actions. While this does affect the seniority
expectations of other employees, the consequences are not as drastic as if
the entire seniority system were invalidated.6
58. Id. at 1791.
59. Id. at 1784 (emphasis added).
60. Id. See Sears v. Bennett, 645 F.2d 1365, 1374 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.
United Transp. Union v. Sears, 102 S. Ct. 2045 (1982); Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
561 F.2d 1064, 1074 (2d Cir. 1977).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 20.
62. 102 S. Ct. at 1790.
63. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774-75 (1976); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
64. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1540 (1982); see also Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 354 (1977) ("Congress did not intend to make it
illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to continue to exercise those rights.").
65. See supra note 13.
66. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976); United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Volger v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 1239
(5th Cir. 1971); cf. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Va. 1968)
("[S]eniority rights of white employees.., are not vested, indefeasible rights.... They are
expectancies derived from the collective bargaining agreement and are subject to modifica-
tion." (citations omitted)).
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The courts are cognizant of the difficult burden a plaintiff bears in
proving discriminatory intent. In General Building Contractors Associa-
tion v. Pennsylvania,67 it was acknowledged that some discriminatory
policies are cleverly masked and that "proof of actual intent is nearly im-
possible."881 The test adopted by the Supreme Court in Pullman-Stan-
dard does not lessen the burden placed on the plaintiff to show discrimi-
natory intent, but it does give him clearer insight into what proof the
courts require.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,69 the
Court held that the seniority system in question was "bona fide" because
the system "applies equally to all races and ethnic groups,. . is in ra-
tional accord with industry practice,. . . did not have its genesis in racial
discrimination, .. . [and] was negotiated and has been maintained free
from any illegal purpose.
7 0
D. The Stockham Test
In James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Co.,7 1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit construed Teamsters to stand for
the proposition that an investigation into discriminatory intent could not
be completed merely by looking at the seniority system itself but must
involve examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
adoption and continued existence of the seniority system.7 2 The Stock-
ham court, in interpreting Teamsters, said that the determination of in-
tent to discriminate in a seniority system is "integral to a determination
that the system is or is not bona fide."' "7 The court of appeals in Stock-
ham then adopted the elements used in Teamsters as a means of judging
the bona fides of a seniority system and employed them as a test for de-
termining whether an employer intentionally had discriminated in estab-
lishing a seniority system.7"
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, in Pullman-
67. 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982).
68. Id. at 3162 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also stated that "[tioday, al-
though flagrant examples of intentional discrimination still exist, discrimination more often
occurs 'on a more sophisticated and subtle level' the effects of which are often as cruel and
devastating as the most crude form of discrimination." Id. at 3161 (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Local 542 Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 648
F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1981).
69. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
70. Id. at 355-56.
71. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
72. 559 F.2d at 352 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
73. 559 F.2d at 351 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 355).
74. 102 S. Ct. at 1785 (citing Stockham, 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1034 (1978)).
1983]
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Standard v. Swint,75 used the Stockham test to determine whether the
seniority system negotiated by the Pullman-Standard Company and the
United Steelworkers Union was adopted with the intent to discriminate. 6
The Supreme Court in Pullman-Standard approved the district court's
criteria for determining the intent to discriminate necessary for a senior-
ity system to be invalidated. 77 By doing so, the Court accepted the Stock-
ham rationale as a test to determine "intention to discriminate. 1 78
The "intention to discriminate test" adopted by the Court in Pullman-
Standard requires an inquiry into four areas to determine whether a par-
ticular seniority system is bona fide.7 9 In a footnote to the opinion, the
Court stated that these four areas were not necessarily the only factors a
court "might or should consider in making a finding of discriminatory
intent,"80 although the Court did not elaborate on other elements a court
could consider. However, it does appear that an inquiry limited to these
four elements would satisfy the required investigation into intent.
The first factor a court must consider is "whether the system 'operates
to discourage all employees equally from transferring between seniority
units.' 81 This element necessarily requires that the seniority system be
neutral on its face and apply equally to all employees regardless of race. 2
The neutrality and equal applicability element is not limited to transfers,
but also is applicable to promotions, layoffs, rehiring, and any other per-
sonnel actions covered by the seniority system.83 Disparate impact on a
group is not the determinant in this area of inquiry because the court is
75. 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
76. Id. at 1785.
77. The Court did not expressly adopt the Stockham test, but did state, in referring to
the Stockham court's use of the bona fide passage in Teamsters, that it "was not meant to
be an exhaustive list of all the factors that a district court might or should consider in
making a finding of discriminatory intent." Id. at 1785 n.8 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
355-56; citing Stockham, 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978)).
By implication, the Court was holding that the Stockham test was valid.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1785.
80. Id. at 1785 n.8 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 355-56; citing Stockham, 559 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978)).
81. 102 S. Ct. at 1785 (quoting Stockham, 559 F.2d at 352). See also Teamsters, 431 U.S.
at 355 ("The seniority system ... is entirely bona fide. It applies equally to all races and
ethnic groups."); Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 1978)
("The seniority provision of the bargaining contract was facially neutral, applying to both
white and black employees ... [c]onsequently [there can be no relief], because this statute
[Title VII] confers on black persons only the same rights possessed by white persons."),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1979).
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1785.
83. The Pullman-Standard Court addressed transfers between seniority units. However,
there is no reason to believe that the test should vary from one aspect of a seniority system
to another.
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focusing on intention rather than consequences.s 4 In its inquiry into the
seniority system of the Pullman-Standard Company, the district court
found that the system applied equally to all races and that the system
was neutral on its face. 5 In McNeil v. McDonough,"' the District Court
for the District of New Jersey stated that "[iln a true seniority system,
the employee with the most seniority has first call, at his choice, .. for the
next promotion. 8 7 In 1964, the Justice Department submitted a memo-
randum to Congress concerning Title VII. It gave the following example
of a seniority provision that did not apply equally to all races: "If a rule
were to state that all Negroes must be laid off before any white men, such
a rule could not serve as the basis for a discharge subsequent to the effec-
tive date."88 Thus, to be a bona fide seniority system under this test, the
seniority provision must treat all races equally. It must be neutral on its
face and offer the person with the most seniority the first opportunity to
accept or reject the transfer, promotion, etc.
"Second, a court must examine the rationality of the departmental
structure, upon which the seniority system relies in light of the general
industry practice."89 There are two basic questions to be asked during
this inquiry. The first is whether the composition of the seniority unit is
rationally related to the nature of the work done within the company.9 0 In
Sears v. Bennett,9 1 a seniority system was not exempted by section 703(h)
because the court found that the system "was not based on a rational
craft delineation.... 9 2 In answering this question, the courts have also
focused on whether the seniority system is related to "business neces-
sity. '93 It does not appear that the absence of business necessity would be
sufficient cause to invalidate an eitire system, however, a showing of bus-
iness necessity would be a defense to a charge that the seniority system
was discriminatory. In a National Labor Relations Board case, the Board
84. Id. at 1784 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977)).
The Supreme Court in Teamsters acknowledged that disparate impact could be considered,
but that the disparate impact standing by itself would not be sufficient under this inquiry.
431 U.S. at 336 n.15, 343 n.20.
85. 102 S. Ct. at 1784. See also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557-58
(1977) ("Nothing alleged in the complaint indicates that United's seniority system treats
existing female employees differently from existing male employees .... "); Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 355 (The seniority system "applies equally to all races and ethnic groups.").
86. 515 F. Supp. 113 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 648 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 144.
88. 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (statement submitted by Justice Department).
89. 102 S. Ct. at 1786 (citing Stockham, 559 F.2d at 352).
90. 102 S. Ct. at 1786.
91. 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. United Transp. Union v. Sears,
102 S. Ct. 2045 (1982).
92. Id. at 1374.
93. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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justified the separation of local drivers and over-the-road drivers "where
they are shown to be clearly defined, homogeneous and functionally dis-
tinct groups with separate interests .... -"I Similarly, the trial court in
Pullman-Standard found that the seniority system was rational in that it
developed from the evolving influences of the unions in different depart-
ments at the company. 95 The second question related to this inquiry is
whether the seniority unit is in conformity with other like units within
the industry. Thus, the court should look at industry-wide practices to
determine if the company whose seniority system is being judged has de-
parted unjustifiably from these practices.96
The third element of the test is "whether the seniority system had its
genesis in racial discrimination. 9 7 In Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,s the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that a seniority
system was not bona fide because it had its "genesis in racial discrimina-
tion."9 The Quarles court made this determination when it found that
the "differences between the terms and conditions of employment for
white[s] and Negroes . . . [were] the result of an intention to discrimi-
nate in hiring policies on the basis of race... -"o0 The court did not look
at the genesis of the seniority system, rather it examined other employ-
ment practices of Philip Morris. The Quarles holding would not meet the
Supreme Court's scrutiny if it were reviewed today. The Court requires
that there be a motive to discriminate in adopting the seniority system, as
opposed to discrimination generally in other employment practices. If the
Quarles genesis analysis were the standard, all companies which adopted
a seniority system at a time when they were discriminating in other areas
of employment could be found to have had an "intention to discriminate"
in adopting their seniority system. This result is contrary to the Congres-
sional goal of protecting vested seniority rights.01
The district court in Pullman-Standard found that "[t]he seniority
system . . . had its genesis . . . at a period when racial segregation was
certainly being practiced; but this system was not itself the product of
this bias. The system rather came about as a result of colorblind objec-
94. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356 n.42 (quoting Georgia Highway Express, 150 N.L.R.B.
1649, 1651).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 1786 n.10.
96. Id. at 1786. See California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980); Teamsters,
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
97. 102 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting Stockham, 559 F.2d at 352).
98. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
99. Id. at 517. See Stockham, 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
100. 279 F. Supp. at 517.
101. See supra notes 15, 16, 17, 28 and accompanying text.
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tives of a union which... was not an arm of a segregated society. '10 2
The district court's conclusion in Pullman-Standard seems to be more
compatible with the Supreme Court's views. A court must find that the
system was adopted because of an intent to discriminate, not because a
seniority system has discriminatory consequences resulting from other
discriminatory employment practices. As noted earlier, section 706(g) al-
lows retroactive seniority relief for employees who have lost seniority
standing as a result of an employer's discriminatory employment
practices.203
The fourth element of the test asks "whether the system was negoti-
ated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose."1 4 The cen-
tral question in this regard is whether the class alleging discriminatory
intent was adequately represented by the bargaining agent. In Pullman-
Standard, the district court reviewed the records of the negotiations as
well as the contracts between the union and the company and found no
evidence that blacks were represented inadequately.10 5 In Local 189,
United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States,10" the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a seniority system had been main-
tained for an illegal purpose.107 The court reviewed the negotiations be-
tween the company and the union and found that both "insisted upon
carrying forward exclusion of a racially-determined class." 08 The court
found the requisite intent from the fact that the company and the union
continued to ratify the same seniority system after the "racial implica-
tions [of the system] had become known to them." ' In James v. Stock-
ham Valves and Fittings Co.110 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
the company guilty of discrimination because it consistently refused the
union's requests to make changes in the seniority system." The courts
recognize, however, that "[s]ignificant freedom must be afforded employ-
ers and unions to create differing seniority systems." 12 In the absence of
a showing of unequal representation or refusal to alter a system that is
known to be discriminatory, the courts will not find discriminatory intent
under the fourth element of the test.
The Court's analysis in Pullman-Standard firmly establishes that proof
102. 102 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting App. to Petn. for Cert. at A-144, Swint v. Pullman-Stan-
dard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980) (No. 80-1190)).
103. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
104. 102 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting Stockham, 559 F.2d at 352).
105. Id. at 1786.
106. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
107. Id. at 997.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1977).
111. Id. at 352-53.
112. California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 602, 608 (1980).
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of actual intent to discriminate is required to invalidate a seniority sys-
tem. Recognizing that proof of actual intent is a very difficult burden on
employees, the Court adopted the "intent to discriminate" test, allowing
employees to focus their attack on the bona fides of the employer's se-
niority system. A question left unresolved by Pullman-Standard is
whether Congress intended that the immunity provided by section 703(h)
protect only those systems in existence prior to the enactment of Title
VII. In American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,'" the Supreme Court was
asked to resolve this question.
IV. THE American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson DECISION
A. Facts
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson was a Title VII challenge to the
validity of the American Tobacco Company's "seniority, wage and job
classification practices."'" The American Tobacco Company owns and
operates a cigarette manufacturing plant and a pipe tobacco manufactur-
ing plant in Richmond, Virginia. Each plant is subdivided into prefabri-
cation and fabrication departments.11 5 Historically, the jobs in the prefab-
rication departments were lower paying and had been held almost
exclusively by blacks. 116 The fabrication department jobs paid more and
were primarily reserved for whites. 1 7 The exclusive bargaining agent for
all of the hourly paid production workers at both plants was the Bakery,
Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International Union and its affiliate,
Local 182.111
The company and the union both admitted to practicing overt racial
discrimination against black employees prior to 1963.111 Due to pressure
from the federal government to cease discriminatory employment prac-
tices, American Tobacco revised its seniority system, providing that pro-
motions were to be based on both plantwide seniority and "job qualifica-
tions."120 In 1968, American Tobacco proposed a job progression system
to replace the seniority/qualifications system,1 21 and in 1969, the union
113. 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982).
114. Id. at 1536.
115. Id. at 1535-36.
116. Id. at 1536.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Prior to 1963, the union maintained separate locals for black and white union mem-
bers. Id.
120. Job qualifications were appraised by the subjective determinations of departmental
supervisors. Between 1963 and 1968, virtually no blacks were deemed "qualified to work in
the white fabrication departments." Id.
121. Job progression is a ranking of jobs according to pay. An employee must start work-
ing in the lowest paying job and move up the line (usually on the basis of seniority) job by
job until he reaches the highest paying job. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535
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ratified the company's proposed system.'2 2 The new job progression sys-
tem established nine lines of progression, six of which were contested in
the lawsuit. Most lines of progression had two jobs.' 23 An employee could
not work in the higher paying job in a particular line until he had worked
in the lower paying one. 124 Traditionally, nearly all the jobs in two of the
contested lines had been reserved for blacks while the jobs in the other
four lines were reserved for whites.
1 25
After the job progression system went into effect, Patterson, a black
employee, and two other black employees filed a claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the job pro-
gression system operated to discriminate against them.2 Patterson con-
tended that, because of prior exclusion of black employees from jobs in
the fabrication plants, they were prevented from moving into the higher
paying jobs in the fabrication plant even though they had more company
seniority than other employees. 27 After the EEOC conciliation attempts
failed, the employees filed a class action suit in the Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of all black employees at
American Tobacco, alleging violations of Title VI. 1" 8 A subsequent action
filed by the EEOC alleging race and sex discrimination was consolidated
for trial with the class action suit.' 29
B. Decision
The district court found that American Tobacco's "seniority, promo-
tion, and job classification practices violated Title VII." 30 The court held
that the effect of the lines of progression was similar to that of the com-
pany's formerly segregated departmental seniority system and that it op-
erated to perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. 3' The district
court ordered American Tobacco to "institute companywide seniority,
eliminate certain lines of progression from lower to higher paying jobs,
.. . grant back pay, and adjust pensions and profit sharing plans .... "32
The court also ordered that white incumbents be bumped from jobs for
which senior black employees were qualified.' 33
F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
122. 102 S. Ct. at 1536.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Patterson, 535 F.2d at 264.
128. 102 S. Ct. at 1536.
129. Id. (citing Patterson, 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976)).
130. 535 F.2d at 264.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 262.
133. Id.
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
but "remanded for further proceedings with respect to remedy." 134 The
court of appeals ruled that the district court erred in ordering the adop-
tion of a companywide seniority system and in ordering that white em-
ployees be removed from their jobs in favor of blacks and women who
had been victims of discrimination. 3 5 On remand to the district court, a
motion was made by American Tobacco and the union to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the job progression system was protected
by section 703(h) of Title VII.1"6 The district court denied the motion.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that even if the lines of progres-
sion were a part of a seniority system, they would not be protected by
section 703(h).13 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. s13
C. Analysis and Significance
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was correct in holding that "Congress intended the
immunity accorded seniority systems by section 703(h) to run only to
those systems in existence at the time of Title VII's effective date, and of
course to routine post-Act application of such systems."1 9
Employee Patterson argued that the section 703(h) immunity was
meant to apply only to seniority systems existing at the time Title VII
went into effect.140 The EEOC contended that section 703(h) protected
"post-Act application of a bona fide seniority system but not the post-
Act adoption of a seniority system or [the adoption of] an aspect of a
seniority system."' 41 The American Tobacco Company argued that sec-
134. 102 S. Ct. at 1536.
135. 535 F.2d at 266-70.
136. 102 S. Ct. at 1536. The American Tobacco Company and the union cited Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, which held that "an otherwise neutral, legiti-
mate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may
perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977).
137. 102 S. Ct. at 1537 (citing Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 749 (4th
Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982)).
138. 102 S. Ct. at 1537.
139. Id. (quoting Patterson, 634 F.2d at 749). In Teamsters, the Supreme Court ruled
that a bona ride seniority system established before the effective date of Title VII, which
did not result in intentional post-Act discrimination, was valid. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
140. 102 S. Ct. at 1537. In employment discrimination cases not protected by the section
703(h) "intention to discriminate" immunity, establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion is much less burdensome. The plaintiff need show only the adverse impact of an em-
ployment practice. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975) (prima facie case made out when plaintiff "has
shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from that pool of applicants").
141. 102 S. Ct. at 1537.
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tion 703(h) applied to all bona fide seniority systems regardless of when
the system was adopted.142
To determine whether Congress intended to treat pre-Act and post-Act
seniority systems differently under section 703(h), the Court first looked
at the plain meaning of the words contained in the section.143 The Court
did not find from "the ordinary meaning of the words used" 144 that there
was any distinction made between pre-Act and post-Act systems. 145
Clearly, there is no express wording in section 703(h) that the section
should apply only to those systems established at the time the section
went into effect.146 To satisfy the "ordinary meaning of the words used"' 47
standard, it would be necessary to insert the phrase "established before
the effective date of Title VII" into that part of section 703(h) referring
to "bona fide seniority systems.' 48
The court then looked to the legislative history to see whether there
was any clear expression by Congress that the language employed in the
Act was to be accorded any special meaning.149 There is express language
in the legislative history referring to existing seniority systems and the
impact of section 703(h) on them. 50 However, as the Court pointed out,
these references were intended to rebut arguments that existing seniority
rights would be destroyed by Title VII.' 51 There are a number of neutral
references in the legislative history concerning which seniority systems
are immune to attack under section 703(h).15 2 The Court did not find any
conclusive evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended sec-
tion 703(h) to apply only to pre-Act seniority systems 153 and reiterated
that "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary
[the plain language of the statute] ... must ordinarily be regarded as
142. Id.
143. Id. See supra text accompanying note 21.
144. 102 S. Ct. at 1537 (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
145. 102 S. Ct. at 1537.
146. See supra text accompanying note 23.
147. Richards v. United States, 396 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
148. See supra text accompanying note 23.
149. 102 S. Ct. at 1537 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
150. "Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes ef-
fect." 110 CONG. Rac. 7207 (1964) (reply to arguments made by Sen. Hill) (emphasis added).
"Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights." Id. at 7213 (interpretive
memorandum by Sens. Clark and Case) (emphasis added). "The bill is not retroactive, and
it will not require an employer to change existing seniority lists." Id. at 7217 (response to
Dirksen memorandum by Sen. Clark) (emphasis added).
151. 102 S. Ct. at 1540.
152. "Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill." 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964)
(response to Dirksen memorandum by Sen. Clark). "The title contains no provisions which
jeopardize union seniority systems. . . ." Id. at 15,866 (a Concise Explanation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by Sen. Humphrey).
153. 102 S. Ct. at 1539 n.6.
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conclusive.'
154
Another indication that section 703(h) was intended to apply to all se-
niority systems was found by comparing that section with other sections
of Title VII. 155 Upon examining Title VII, the Court determined that
there were specific "grandfather clauses"'' 5  in other sections,157 which in-
dicated to the Court that had Congress intended a "grandfather clause" it
would have expressly included one in section 703(h). The Court stated
that "had Congress intended so fundamental a distinction, it would have
expressed that intent clearly in the statutory language or the legislative
history."' 5 8
The distinction offered by the EEOC between application of and adop-
tion of seniority systems was also found untenable. 159 The Court recog-
nized that a seniority system cannot have a discriminatory effect until it
154. Id. at 1537 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
155. 102 S. Ct. at 1537. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 89 (1906) ("[The
language of a statute is to be interpreted... by other parts of the act, and the words used
may be qualified by their surroundings and connections."). Cf. National Labor Relations Bd.
v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) ("It has thus become a judicial responsibility to
find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be embedded in the statute, in the
sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purpose that Congress
manifested.").
156. 102 S. Ct. at 1537. A grandfather clause is a provision in a law that exempts systems
in operation at the time of enactment of the law from being regulated by the law. See
Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 405, 409 (D. Del. 1943).
157. Section 701(b) of Title VII is an example of a Title VII section that contains a
grandfather clause. Section 701(b) reads, in part:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has twenty-five or more employees.... Provided, that during the first year after the
effective date ... persons having fewer than one hundred employees (and their
agents) shall not be considered employers, and, during the second year after such
date, persons having fewer than seventy-five employees (and their agents) shall not
be considered employers, and, during the third year after such date, persons having
fewer than fifty employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253-54
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1976)). See also Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 701(e), Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(e) 78 Stat. 254 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(e) (1976). Section 701(e) provides:
A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce if ... the number of its members ... is (A) one hundred or more during the
first year after the effective date ... (B) seventy-five or more during the second year
after such date or fifty or more during the third year, or (C) twenty-five or more
thereafter ....
Id.
158. 102 S. Ct. at 1539 n.6.
159. There is virtually no difference in Patterson's and the EEOC's claims. Patterson con-
tends that only bona fide systems adopted before the Act's effective date are protected from
the discriminatory impact test. Therefore, logically, he also contends, as does the EEOC,
that the discriminatory impact test should be applied to all post-Act seniority systems.
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is applied. 60 Therefore, according to the Court, the only way a seniority
system "adopted" but not yet "applied" could be discriminatory would be
if there were proof of a discriminatory purpose.16 1 Since discriminatory
purpose is the present standard to show "intention to discriminate"
under section 703(h), 162 the Court could find no logical reason advanced
by the EEOC to apply a different standard for seniority systems adopted
after enactment of Title VII.
In addition, the EEOC interpretation was rejected on the grounds that
if a disparate impact test were applied to newly adopted or modified se-
niority systems, the application of such a test actually would discourage
companies from trying to lessen the discriminatory effect of a seniority
system.1 6 3 For example, if a company modified its pre-Act seniority sys-
tem so that it had a fifty percent less discriminatory effect than the previ-
ous system, but still had a discriminatory impact, the company would be
in violation of Title VII. Therefore, the company, knowing that the pre-
Act system would continue to be immune to a Title VII action, would be
less likely to implement a new system that possibly could be found to
violate Title VII. The Court viewed this result as contrary to the stated
purpose of Title VII 6 4 and held that "[s]tatutes should be interpreted to
avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possi-
ble."1' 5 The Court also pointed out that seniority provisions are impor-
tant factors in collective bargaining negotiations, and that both Congress
and the courts have favored minimal supervision of collective bargaining
agreements.1 66 Section 703(h) was perceived by the Court as an attempt
by Congress to balance the important goals of Title VII against the na-
tional labor policy "favoring minimal governmental intervention in collec-
tive bargaining. '1 67
By reading the plain language of section 703(h), by failing to discover a
clear legislative intent to the contrary, by looking at Title VII in toto, and
160. 102 S. Ct. at 1538.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1977) ("[T]he para-
mount concern of Congress in enacting Title VII was the elimination of discrimination in
employment."). See also supra text accompanying notes 2, 4.
165. 102 S. Ct. at 1538. See Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1977) (In
construing a statute "[tihe interpretation should be reasonable, and where the result of one
interpretation is unreasonable while the result of another interpretation is logical, the latter
should prevail.") (citing C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.14 (4th ed.
1973)); Cf. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971) ("If an absolutely
literal reading of a [criminal] statutory provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear con-
gressional purpose, a less literal construction must be considered.").
166. 102 S. Ct. at 1541 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964); California
Brewers Ass'n. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980)).
167. 102 S. Ct. at 1541 n.17.
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by considering section 703(h) in relation to national labor policy, the
Court concluded that Congress intended section 703(h) to apply to both
pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems.
V. CONCLUSION
The goal of Congress in enacting Title VII was to assure all persons
equal employment opportunities. Congress mandated that employers are
not to make employment decisions that favor or harm an identifiable
class of persons. When an employer's actions have the effect of discrimi-
nating against a protected class, the employer will be enjoined from con-
tinuing the discriminatory practice and will be directed to make right
their discriminatory acts by putting the discriminatees in the position in
which they would have been but for the employer's discrimination.
Congress did not intend that employees be penalized for the actions of
their employer. Realizing that invalidating a seniority system would pun-
ish the innocent employee rather than the discriminating employer, Con-
gress included section 703(h) in Title VII which immunizes a seniority
system from the discriminatory consequences test. The section does not
bar a discriminatee from being awarded seniority relief; it merely protects
the seniority system, without jeopardizing other employees' seniority
rights. Section 706(g) allows a discriminatee to be inserted in the senior-
ity system in the position in which he would have been had there been no
discrimination.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Pullman-Standard and Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. are consistent with the legislature's aim of protecting the
vested seniority rights of innocent employees. The Pullman-Standard
decision firmly establishes that absent proof of actual intention to dis-
criminate in the adoption of a seniority system, a system will not be in-
validated by the courts. The American Tobacco Co. decision accurately
reflects congressional intent that a bona fide seniority system be pro-
tected by section 703(h) regardless of the time the system was adopted.
Joseph D. McCluskey
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